What is CAA?
CAA (Certification Authority Authorization) is a DNS record that names which certificate authorities are allowed to issue a certificate for a domain. Without one, any of the hundreds of publicly trusted CAs in the world can issue a certificate for it. CAA lets a domain owner restrict that in advance, rather than only finding out after the fact via Certificate Transparency logs.
CAA is optional; RFC 8659 does not require it. This check still reports a missing record as a problem, because it is the only way to set that restriction in advance. That is this tool's position, not an RFC rule.
Absence isn't always what it looks like
An empty CAA lookup on the exact domain you're checking doesn't necessarily mean "unrestricted". Under RFC 8659 a name with no CAA record of its own defers to its parent, and so on upwards. A subdomain with no CAA record can still be fully restricted by a record set higher up the tree. This check follows that chain rather than stopping at the first empty answer.
Where the chain stops climbing
RFC 8659 section 3 climbs "up to, but not including, the DNS root". For www.example.co.uk that means www.example.co.uk, example.co.uk, co.uk and finally uk. The first of these with any CAA record supplies the rules, and the climb stops there. A registry may publish CAA for its whole zone, so the top-level domain is asked too. Where the registrable domain ends plays no part in this; the climb does not look at the Public Suffix List.
Aliases (CNAME) are followed by the resolver, as section 7 describes; the climb itself only removes labels from the name you entered.
Only a normal answer, or "this name does not exist", lets the climb go on. If a lookup on the way up fails (SERVFAIL, often a DNSSEC validation failure, or REFUSED), the rules for the name cannot be determined, and this check says so instead of reporting a parent's records or none at all. A certificate authority that runs into the same failure will usually refuse to issue.
issue vs issuewild
The issue tag restricts standard certificates. issuewild separately restricts wildcard certificates (e.g. *.example.com): if it is present, issue is ignored for wildcard certificates; if it is absent, wildcards fall back to whatever issue allows.
Several issue records add up: every CA named in any of them is allowed. A value without a CA's hostname, such as ; or ; name=value, names no CA. On its own it means "no CA is authorised at all" for that tag, a deliberate way to block issuance entirely and easy to set by mistake too. Next to a record that does name a CA, it adds nothing and forbids nothing. A value that does not fit RFC 8659's grammar, for example a hostname followed by a stray word, must be treated the same way as one that names no CA, so it does not authorise the CA it seems to name.
The iodef tag
The optional iodef tag gives a CA somewhere to report an issuance request it refused because it wasn't authorised. That gives useful visibility into attempted or accidental mis-issuance, similar in spirit to how DMARC and TLS-RPT give visibility elsewhere.
Restricting a CA further still
RFC 8657 adds two optional parameters after a CA's hostname: accounturi= locks issuance to one specific account at that CA (so even a compromised account belonging to someone else at the same CA can't issue for this domain), and validationmethods= restricts which domain-control proof that CA may accept. Both are rare, and both are genuinely stronger than the CA name alone.